For more than four decades, the Islamic Republic has pursued a foreign policy that extends well beyond defending its own borders. Since the 1979 revolution, Tehran has sought to project influence through ideological outreach, military cooperation and strategic partnerships. While often presented as support for revolutionary ideals, this approach has repeatedly translated into political and strategic expansion in fragile states. Today, as Sudan’s civil war continues, Iran’s renewed engagement raises questions that extend far beyond the battlefield. It reflects a pattern that has shaped Tehran’s regional strategy for decades.
A Strategy of Influence
Shortly after the 1979 revolution, Iran institutionalized the concept of exporting its revolution. Although framed in religious terms, the policy evolved into a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at expanding Iranian influence. Rather than relying solely on diplomacy, Tehran cultivated relationships with armed groups, political movements and sympathetic actors. From Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen to repeated attempts to interfere in Gulf security, the Islamic Republic has consistently exploited instability and weak institutions. Bahrain and other Gulf states have long warned of such interference. One lesson has emerged repeatedly: Iran has struggled to establish lasting influence in cohesive states with resilient institutions, while fragile states have often provided opportunities for Tehran to expand its reach. Sudan increasingly appears to fit this pattern.
Iran’s Return to Sudan
Iran’s renewed engagement with Sudan is not new. During Omar al Bashir’s presidency, the two countries formalized defence cooperation in 1991 and developed close military and security ties. Sudan reportedly served as a transit point for Iranian weapons destined for Palestinian armed groups through Egypt and Gaza.
Relations cooled after Sudan closed Iranian cultural centres in 2014, joined the Saudi led coalition in Yemen in 2015 and severed diplomatic relations with Tehran in January 2016. Yet decades of cooperation left behind military relationships and institutional links. When diplomatic relations were restored in 2023, Tehran returned not as a newcomer but as a former strategic partner reconnecting with existing networks.
Reports throughout 2024 suggested that Iranian military assistance had become increasingly visible on the battlefield, particularly through the reported transfer of Iranian-made drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Analysts noted that these systems enhanced the army’s surveillance and strike capabilities at a critical stage of the conflict, demonstrating that Tehran’s support had evolved beyond political engagement into tangible military cooperation. While the full extent of this assistance remains difficult to verify independently, its reported impact highlights Iran’s willingness to leverage defence partnerships to strengthen long term strategic relationships with state actors. Unlike Iran’s traditional proxy model, Sudan represents cooperation with the armed forces of a sovereign state.
Why Sudan? Why Now?
Sudan offers Iran influence along the western shore of the Red Sea, complementing Tehran’s existing leverage through the Houthis on the eastern side of this vital maritime corridor. At a time of domestic pressure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continues seeking opportunities to expand Iran’s strategic reach, and Sudan offers access to a region where Tehran has historically maintained limited influence.
Sudan also illustrates an important regional lesson. Iran has generally achieved its greatest gains where governments have been weakened by war, political fragmentation or institutional collapse. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen each created opportunities as state authority eroded. By contrast, resilient states with effective institutions have proven far more resistant to Tehran’s ambitions. Strong states leave little room for foreign exploitation, while fragile states often invite it.
The Islamic Republic’s ambitions in Africa are not limited to military cooperation alone. Recent images of African groups mourning Iran’s Supreme Leader highlight the extent of Tehran’s ideological outreach across the continent. Whether through religious institutions, educational initiatives or political engagement, Iran has spent decades cultivating relationships that complement its broader strategic objectives. Sudan should therefore be viewed not as an isolated case, but as part of a wider effort to expand the Iranian influence in Africa.
Sudan’s geography alone explains much of Iran’s interest. Stretching along the western shore of the Red Sea, the country overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. The Red Sea connects the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean via the Bab al Mandab Strait, carrying a significant share of global trade, energy exports and commercial shipping. Any disruption along this route has immediate consequences for international supply chains, energy markets and maritime security, as demonstrated by repeated attacks on commercial vessels in recent years.
For Tehran, expanding its presence in Sudan would complement the influence it has already cultivated through the Houthis on the opposite side of the Red Sea in Yemen. Such a position would provide Iran with strategic relationships on both shores of a waterway that also borders Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Djibouti and the wider Horn of Africa. Beyond maritime considerations, the Horn of Africa has become an increasingly important arena for international competition involving regional and global powers seeking access to ports, trade routes and military facilities. Establishing a stronger foothold in Sudan would therefore enhance Iran’s ability to project influence not only across the Red Sea but also into northeast Africa, reinforcing its broader geopolitical ambitions.
Another Strategic Blind Spot
Iran’s growing role in Sudan should not be viewed simply as another aspect of Sudan’s civil war. For years, many governments hoped diplomacy and economic engagement would moderate Tehran’s regional behaviour. Yet throughout periods of dialogue, Iran continued expanding relationships with armed groups and strategic partners.
Sudan is a different context, but the lesson remains relevant: prolonged instability creates opportunities for external actors to establish influence that becomes increasingly difficult to reverse.
The evolution of the Houthis demonstrates how gradually such influence can develop. What began in the early 2000s as a relatively small insurgent movement gradually evolved into a heavily armed force with the ability to launch long range missiles and drones, threaten neighbouring countries and disrupt one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
Today, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandab have demonstrated how a local conflict can evolve into a challenge with global economic consequences. The lesson is not that every conflict will follow the same trajectory, but that prolonged instability provides opportunities for external actors to cultivate influence that can eventually extend far beyond a country’s borders.
The most effective defense against such interference is not military power alone but strong institutions, national cohesion and resilient governance. Bahrain and several of its Gulf neighbours demonstrate that capable states are far less vulnerable to external manipulation than societies weakened by conflict and division. As the war in Sudan continues, policymakers should recognise the wider geopolitical implications of Iran’s renewed presence before another long-term strategic foothold takes root.