Bahrain

The origins of Bahrain’s political opposition: Part 3

admin May 7, 2014 no Comments

See Part One on the origins of Daw’ah and the Shirazi movement in Iraq

See Part Two on the Da’wah movement in Bahrain

By the 1970s Shia organizations were increasingly predominant as a Bahraini political force, with a visible presence during the Parliament of 1973 following independence. However, Shia clerics and activists were increasingly divided into two factions; Al-Da’wah and the Shirazis.

These factions were directly descended from Shia Islamic trends in Iraq. Al-Da’wah took its lead from the traditional sources of authority in Iraqi Al-Najaf; while the Shirazis looked to Mohammed Shirazi from the Iraqi city of Karbala.

Origins of the Shirazi current in Bahrain

The Al-Da’wah/Shirazi divide wasn’t immediately obvious in Bahrain in the early 1970s. Although different Bahraini religious figures may have looked to different sources of emulation, like Grand Ayatollah Abulqasem al-Khoei or Sayyed Mohammed Shirazi; little significance was attributed to this at the time.

Mohammed Shirazi’s nephew, Hadi al-Mudarrisi (director of the Iraq-based Islamic Action Organization), was a predominant figure in establishing a “Shirazi” orientation in parts of Bahrain.

Initially, it was widely assumed that this high-profile relative of Mohammed Shirazi was just passing through Bahrain, and that “Shirazi-ism” as a distinct trend would quickly fade. However, in 1974 Al-Mudarrisi acquired Bahraini citizenship. It thus became obvious to Al-Da’wah activists that Al-Mudarrisi was in Bahrain to stay and was therefore a key rival.

“A fierce struggle for the Shi’a khums money erupted between the two factions. Sheikh [Isa] Qassim and Al-Mudarrisi competed with each other from Mosque to Mosque and ma’atam [Shi’a religious institutions] to ma’atam to attract the greatest number of followers and greatest amount of khums.” (A. Alfoneh)

Al-Mudarrisi and other Shirazis were active in recruiting supporters in the urban and less traditional areas, like the island of Al-Muharraq and Manama. Although they attracted many “Bahraini” Shia; they were particularly successful amongst the “Ajam” – Bahrainis of recent Persian origin.

The Shirazis gained many supporters among wealthy Shia traders and businessmen, such as the influential Alawi family; and through these gained access to Bahraini elites.

The establishment of the Islamic Guidance Society in 1969 was a further indicator of a new phase of religious-political activism. It was formed after Mohammed al-Alawi travelled to Iraq and met Mohammed Shirazi, who had a major influence on him.

The Islamic Guidance Society succeeded in forming the first nucleus for an organized Shirazi movement in Bahrain and achieved a wide membership for meetings and religious festivals.

In 1972 the Social Hussaini Fund was founded as an expansion of the Islamic Guidance Society and led by Shirazi figures like Jaafar al-Alawi, with support from Hadi al-Mudarrisi.

The Social Hussaini Fund recruited from among students, intellectuals and businessmen and built its cadres for its organized secret action. Its aims included both building support and preparing the ground for political revolution in Bahrain.

Consolidation and radicalization of the Shirazis

As a result of this activity, the two main strands of Shia activism (Da’wah and Shirazi) became relatively permanent and stable features on the Bahraini political landscape.

However, this situation would be transformed in 1979 by the Iranian Islamic Revolution; with Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters providing massive support for clandestine Shirazi organization, with the aim of spreading the Islamic Revolution to Bahrain and other Gulf states.

Although the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was only openly declared after the 1979 Iranian revolution, activists stress that its networks were already being secretly constructed within these predecessor organizations prior to 1979.

So although the Islamic Front’s sudden prominence can be attributed to Iranian backing, the roots of Shirazi political radicalism were already in place.

Table showing differences between the Da’wah & Shirazi factions in Bahrain

Da’wah / Islamic Enlightenment Society	Shirazis / Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain
Looking to the Grand Ayatollahs of Al-Najaf as the source of authority	Looking to Mohammed Shirazi in Karbala as source of authority; with his nephews Mohammed Taqi al-Mudarrisi and Hadi al-Mudarrisi as highly influential
Conservative and traditional in outlook; centred around established clerics	Radical and innovative; inspired by charisma of leading figures
Centred around rural Bahraini areas	Centred around urban areas & more newly established religious institutions
Membership mostly among “Bahrani” community; didn’t recruit among urban “Ajam”	High proportion of “Ajam”; of Iranian origin
Tendency to be secretive & inward-looking; organizationally influenced by Al-Da’wah’s hierarchical & cell-based structure.	Sometimes clandestine; but open in seeking close ties with traders & elites in order to gain influence
Relying on its traditional popularity & strength in order to force concessions from authorities & encourage reform	Revolutionary aspirations – particularly after 1979
Became closer to Iranian Conservatives like Ali Khamenei during early 1980s; but initially benefitted less from Iranian support after 1979	Close to Iran’s revolutionary leadership; supported by Iran’s ‘leftist’ current who believed in spreading the revolution abroad. Lost influence after Mohammed Shirazi fell-out with Ayatollah Khomeini
Tended to support the idea of a Bahraini nation state	Committed to revolutionary ideology of spreading Islam round the world; against the idea of the nation state