The below work is based on Citizens for Bahrain research about the activity of the elected Chamber of Representatives. Data on each of the MPs can be found via this link.
2014 Parliament
There are many unique factors about Bahrain’s 2014 Parliament, which came together following the November 2014 elections.
Seventy-five percent of MPs are brand new to the Parliament, with 30 out of 40 former MPs not regaining their seats at the last elections. Ninety percent of parliamentarians (36 out of 40) are independents with no formal political affiliations after political societies performed disastrously at the polls.
This is the first Parliament to benefit from a host of new powers and we have seen MPs using these enthusiastically over recent months, forcing substantial modifications to the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan and pledging to take decisive action against instances of corruption cited in the latest Financial Audit Bureau report.
The average age of MPs is now substantially lower, with many new deputies entering Parliament on a “pro-youth” platform. We also see a reassuring number of experienced technocratic figures and experts in a range of fields.
Many MPs, including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Parliament, have been sharply critical of how the previous Parliament went about its business. In their view, the previous Parliament was not sufficiently assertive in holding the Government to account, limited its own powers and devoted too much time to political disputes, rather than standing up for the interests of their constituents.
A Parliament without factionalism?
As we have noted, political societies were almost entirely wiped out in the 2014 elections, so the new Parliament is almost entirely made up of independent figures.
There have clearly been attempts to form blocs within the Parliament, but these so far have produced few obvious results. As we shall review below, there are a number of Sunni Islamic figures who are naturally affiliated on several issues, but this has not resulted in the formation of a coherent bloc and there is apparent reluctance by these independent MPs to align themselves too closely with the Salafist Al-Asalah Society – the only political society with more than one MP in the Parliament.
There was an announcement in February of four MPs forming a “Bahrain National Bloc”. These were all moderate Sunni MPs, however, there has since been no mention of this bloc and little evidence of these MPs aligning themselves.
When we look at joint statements and joint proposals issued so far during the course of this Parliament, we almost always discover that these are signed by a diverse range of MPs and not a particular faction. Most such statements are signed by both Sunni and Shia MPs, by Islamists and moderates and by MPs from constituencies all across Bahrain (apart from when a proposal concerns a local issue).
There are certainly particular MPs who do not get along well with each other and some personal disputes have been covered in the media, e.g.; Mohammed al-Ahmed was strongly attacked by certain MPs regarding statements he made concerning the Secretariat General. The 10 February walkout (on a related issue) triggered by Al-Ahmed and a number of Islamist MPs also seemed likely to precipitate divisions within the Parliament. However, these tensions do not seem to have given rise to any specific alignments.
With only 40 MPs, Bahrain has a relatively small Parliament, so most MPs necessarily are working together very closely on the various committees. This is perhaps another factor in mitigating against distinct divisions.
In many of the big recent issues, like the debt ceiling, the Audit Report and the Government Action Plan, what we actually saw was the majority of MPs uniting on a common position. In some cases this common position was in opposition to the Government’s own position.
This has arguably helped shape the sense of identity of the 2014 Parliament as a united body which cooperates with the Government on many issues, lobbies the Government; on others and on some occasions it directly confronts the Government – such as with MPs’ refusal to raise the debt ceiling.
Consensus issues
Paradoxically, two of the main calls that have united most MPs during the early months of the Parliament was to increase spending on benefits for lower income families – and to get public borrowing under control. For example, MPs recently voted against an increase in the debts ceiling and then came out strongly demanding that this decision would not affect pledges on a range of social support payments.
The more economically-minded MPs like Isa al-Kooheji and Ahmed Qaratah would argue that the way of squaring this apparent contradiction is to dramatically tighten the oversight of public spending to reduce wastage, while investing in economic programmes to increase government revenues.
However, with the issuing of the Budget in early May, it started to become obvious that borrowing would be a requirement in order to budget for the public services which mattered to MPs and the public. This resulted in many MPs shifting their positions on borrowing, with an Al-Watan newspaper poll on 15 May finding that 20 MPs were conditionally ready to accept an increase in borrowing to a 7bn BD ceiling, and only 10 MPs who remained opposed, including figures like Ahmed Qaratah and Abdulrahman Bu-Ali.
The fact that such a high proportion of MPs were willing to shift their position on such a crucial issue, shows where the priorities of a substantial majority of MPs lie: Providing essential services to lower income households.
So the majority – if not all MPs – are committed to ensuring increased spending on Government housing and widening eligibility for housing provision; and guaranteeing programmes like “counter-inflationary” support to help low-income families cope with increasing living costs; while improving public services and infrastructure.
The extended process of negotiations between MPs and ministers over the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan was primarily concerned with such issues.
A further unifying issue is securing preferential treatment for jobs for qualified Bahrainis. This has seen MPs strongly lobbying the Health and Education Ministry to ensure that Bahraini graduates are preferred for teaching and medical careers. This also put MPs at odds with the Government and Shura Council over a proposed bill for ensuring that private sector businesses preferred Bahrainis over foreign workers. The Shura Council and Government argued that this fell fowl of international legislation guaranteeing equal rights for all workers compromised the rights of the private sector to choose their staff – as well as noting that the proposal may be unenforceable.
A related issue is that of unregistered foreign workers operating under the so-called “free visa” system. MPs have been united in calling for tougher action and a committee was recently formed to address this issue.
The other major consensus issue has been the Financial Audit Bureau report. MPs have spoken with one voice in calling for tough action against officials who have committed violations and the right to interrogate ministers on transgressions which occurred on their watch. There is a general consensus that the previous Parliament was not sufficiently activist in fulfilling its oversight role and many MPs have been strongly critical about the manner in which the previous Parliament effectively limited its own powers.
MPs from the previous Parliament
There are ten MPs who remained from the previous Parliament. Unsurprisingly, they have been disproportionately represented in the senior roles, such as head of Parliament, Second Deputy and heads of several of the key committees.
Despite being a minority, these are figures with more experience of parliamentary business, so their voices have tended to carry greater weight during parliamentary sessions. They also have detailed knowledge of legislation held over from the former Parliament and a good understanding of the workings of various government departments. However, we already see these inherent advantages gradually being chipped away as their newer colleagues gain greater experience.
Note about describing MPs’ affiliations
As we have made clear, there are no clear-cut factions in the current Parliament. When we group MPs together in the below sections, these are not clear and recognized divisions, but aim to give a sense of the approach of MPs in their activities and voting behaviour.
The MPs themselves may well disagree with the way we have described their affiliations. However, we have grouped them in this way to try and help readers better understand the tendencies within the Parliament, while recognizing that these groupings are malleable and loosely defined. As we will illustrate, the way we have grouped MPs has been broadly in line with the findings of our statistical analysis based on their Effectiveness Ratings. (The effectiveness ratings for each MP and an explanation of the ratings can be found through the following link: http://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/entry/know-your-deputy
Progressive MPs
We refer here to younger MPs like Ghazi Al Rahmah (4th Northern), Nasir al-Qaseer (5th Capital) and Jalal al-Mahfoudh (2nd Northern). These are figures who won their seats by articulating the grievances of the Bahraini youth and disaffected local people. Al-Mahfoudh already has an impressive record of raising a whole range of issues in support of local people.
Statistical analysis indicates four MPs who could be described as Strong Progressives – Jamila al-Sammak (12 Northern), Rua al-Haiki (6th Northern), Ghazi Al Rahmah and Jalal al-Mahfoudh. These figures score high both on the Progressive Index and the Public Service Index. Thus they are the only figures who score above 7 on the combined Social/Progressive Index – along with Adel Bin-Hamid (3rd Capital – who we’ve cited as an Activist, because of his strong Economic/Governance credentials.
Progressives tend to score low on the National Security rating (covering both regional and domestic security issues). They tend to not score highly on economic ratings – possibly because these are generally younger MPs who are less comfortable speaking out in an open Parliament on complex macroeconomic issues. However, they tend to score moderately on Good Governance indices.
These are socially liberal figures with a strong commitment to serving local constituents. Many of these MPs tend to be less comfortable debating macroeconomic issues (with the exception of Al-Haiki and Al-Qaseer) and matters related to good governance, like government debt levels. These are figures focused on local issues and improving the lives of constituents.
Most of the Progressive MPs (with the exception of Al-Shaer and Al-Dossary) are Shia and come from traditionally pro-opposition constituencies.
Al-Wefaq’s continuing boycott of the parliamentary process cleared the way for a new generation of relatively liberal and socially activist figures who have been quick to show their worth in the Parliament.
Four MPs who scored less highly on progressive ratings (Mohammed al-Dossary – 3rd Northern, Khalid al-Shaer – 1st Southern, Osamah al-Khajah – 7th Capital and Nasser al-Qaseer) also tend to be younger figures who share the liberal commitments of the Strong Progressives, but have tended to be less visible and activist in their pursuit of constituent interests. However, Al-Khajah has a strong record on health and Al-Qaseer is clearly closely affiliated with the Activist MPs in having a strong interest in economic and governance issues.
One positive factor regarding these young Progressive MPs is how willing they have been to work with one another to propose measures and raise issues of concern. The Sunni MP Hamad al-Dossary is notable for collaborating closely with his Shia colleagues from neighbouring constituencies.
In the early parliamentary sessions some of the younger MPs seem to have been somewhat overawed by their older and more experienced peers and were relatively less willing to stand up and speak. However, this balance seems to gradually being redressed. Jalal al-Mahfoudh is becoming an increasingly assertive parliamentary speaker and others are standing up and speaking on key issues with greater regularity.
Khalid al-Shaer is a popular younger figure, who as head of the Human Rights Committee has already made a name for himself speaking up for Bahrain’s reputation at international events.
The three women in the 2014 Parliament are all young and socially-progressive Shia. They are also new entrants to Parliament from these same traditionally pro-Wefaq localities. Dr. Jamila al-Sammak heads the Committee for Women and Families, and as a result has been active in pushing through legislation protecting women and families from domestic violence.
Fatima al-Asfour (1st Northern) has also spoken out about Parliament’s duty to promote women in society, saying: “We must perform our duty as the legislative body to cooperate with the executive to enhance the role of women and grant them their full rights”.
Rua al-Haiki (6th Northern) enters Parliament with very impressive credentials as a business consultant with a strong record of running programmes for up skilling unemployed Bahrainis. She has also been articulate and active in raising a range of issues from the economy to living standards.
Abbas al-Madhi (6th Muharraq) fits less comfortably into this category as an experienced figure from the previous Parliament. However, he has a moderate record in addressing social issues and taking an interest in human rights and reform. He comes from the only Shia/opposition-majority constituency in Muharraq.
Geographically, in the past more progressive MPs have tended to come from the mixed central areas of Bahrain. The conurbations of Isa Town and Zaid Town have often produced a diverse range of forward-thinking MPs. In 2014 the two constituencies centred on these areas produced Khaled al-Shaer and Mohammed al-Ahmed (see the Activists), two young and energetic figures who have quickly found their niches in the new Parliament.
As we have already noted, the continued withdrawal of Al-Wefaq from the parliamentary process has given rise to a new crop of younger MPs in traditionally pro-opposition Shia majority localities. The result is that the Progressives are primarily clustered in the northern constituencies of the Northern Governorate (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th & 12th Northern) and central Manama (5th, 7th & 9th Capital) and Abbas al-Madhi in 6th Muharraq, the only Muharraq locality with a significant proportion of pro-opposition constituents.
Islamist and Conservative MPs
There are around 6-9 MPs who represent a Sunni Islamic fringe in the Parliament. However, so far, several factors have discouraged them from acting as a coherent bloc. The two Islamist MPs from the previous Parliament – Mohammed al-Ammadi (Al-Minbar, 10th Northern) and Abdulhalim Murad (Al-Asalah, 3rd Northern) have often appeared reluctant to identify themselves with Islamic issues.
Mohammed al-Ammadi in particular has almost entirely confined himself to prosaic issues concerning constituents, like housing, services and transport. Abdulhalim Murad on some occasions has been active on Islamic issues, but – for example – during the major controversy over the singing of Quranic verses during a school talent contest, Murad urged his colleagues not to go too far in raising the matter.
The third member of an Islamic society – Ali al-Muqla (Al-Asalah, 7th Muharraq) – has been much for vocal on Islamic issues, often aligning himself with the two Sunni clerics, Nabil al-Balooshi (10th Capital) and Anas Buhindi (6th Southern).
Other MPs like Abdulhamid al-Najjar (9th Northern) and Jamal Buhassan (3rd Muharraq) have clear Islamic affiliations, but are also highly active on a range of other issues, and so can’t be considered to sit comfortably within an Islamist camp.
There are two Shia clerics, Shaikh Majid al-Asfour (8th Capital) and Shaikh Majid al-Majid (7th Northern), made it into Parliament in 2014. Both these figures have mostly shunned ideological issues and focused on pragmatic subjects that can make a tangible difference to their constituents, such as public infrastructure and employment. As head of the Legal Committee, Majid al-Majid has quickly become one of the most significant figures in Parliament.
However, when amendments to the penal code were proposed in Parliament, both these clerics took a very outspoken position in rejecting definitions of domestic sexual abuse, stressing the rights of the husband over his wife.
So, on balance, we decided to put figures like Al-Ammadi, Al-Majid, Al-Asfour and Najjar and Buhassan in the Conservative camp, because based on their actual parliamentary performance, that was found to be where they fitted best.
A handful of other MPs have a clear tendency towards voting along Islamic lines, but also have a much broader agenda. Figures like Ibrahim al-Hammadi (2nd Muharraq), Ali Bufarsan (1st Muharraq), Mohammed al-Maarifi (4th Southern), Jamal Dawoud (11th Northern), Isa Turki (8th Northern), and Dhiyab al-Noaimi (8th Southern) could perhaps be described as a centrist-conservative tendency.
When we look at the statistical analysis, the four Islamist/Salafist MPs (Murad, Al-Balooshi, Al-Muqla and Buhindi) stand out. They score very low on the Progressive index (between 2 and 3) and have relatively low scores on the Economic/Governance Index and the Public Service Index.
Our Conservative grouping tend to score between 3.5 and 4 on the Progressive Index and have a broader range of scores on the Economic/Governance Index and Public Service Index, with Al-Majid, Al-Ammadi and Mohammed al-Asfour producing above average responses on Economic/Governance.
Many Islamists and Conservatives tend to score high on the Policing and Regional Security rating. This is commonly due to a tendency to be very outspoken against Iran’s regional role and on domestic policing. The Shia clerics have lower ratings on these criteria.
Conservative MPs are willing to vote against the recommendations of the Government when these recommendations go against the Parliament consensus, but tend to avoid undue criticism of the establishment.
The Conservatives and Islamists tend to be grouped in specific areas across Bahrain. The four Hamad Town constituencies have all gone to Conservatives (8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Northern. The central Muharraq constituencies have all gone to Conservative and Islamist figures (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 7th Muharraq) – an area where Islamists were even stronger in the past.
The core Southern constituencies are almost wholly Loyalist and Conservative. The 1st and 2nd Southern constituencies are slightly different, having formerly belonged to the defunct Central Governorate and traditionally being a fertile area for progressive MPs. 10th Capital had been part of the Central Governorate and belonged to an independent female MP, Sumayah al-Jowder – but in a crowded elections contest was won by Sunni cleric Nabil al-Balooshi!
However, 4th, 5th and 9th Southern are held by MPs we have classed as Conservative. 3rd and 6th Southern are held by Islamist MPs. The 5th 8th and 10th Southern districts are held by Loyalists.
The Southern Governorate is centred around Riffa, the heartland of the Monarchy and Bahrain’s ruling elites. As a result, it is core Loyalist territory and most seats can be expected to go to conservative Sunnis.
Activist MPs (Economic/Governance)
There are a number of MPs who score very highly on Economic/Good Governance indices. They are outspoken on both macroeconomic issues and issues related to government finance. As well as having a broad economic vision and often coming from a business or administrative background; these MPs are willing to speak out against “wastage” of public funds and instances of poor governance.
The most clearly-defined “Activists” are Chairman of the Finance Committee Isa al-Kooheji (4th Muharraq), Ahmed Qaratah (2nd Capital), Adel Bin-Hamid (3rd Capital), Mohammed al-Ahmed (2nd Southern), Abdulrahman Bu-Ali (8th Muharraq) and Deputy Chairman of Parliament Ali al-Aradi (5th Northern).
The distinguishing feature of many of these MPs in comparison with the Progressive camp is their focus on big-picture macroeconomic issues, with less attention given to local issues (although Bin-Hamid scores highly on the Progressive criteria as well).
Note that both Progressives and Activists could be loosely described as pro-reform MPs. However, the stereotypical Progressive MP tends to perform highly on measures of responsiveness to local constituents and score well on attitudes to human rights; they generally score less highly on macroeconomic and public governance issues. Many of these MPs have a tendency to take a somewhat more activist confrontational approach vis-à-vis the Government.
Mohammed al-Ahmed has arguably been one of the most controversial MPs in the current Parliament, a factor which has raised tensions with some of his colleagues. He has accused the Parliament Secretariat General in doing its business in underhand ways; was highly outspoken in relation to abuses cited in the Financial Audit Bureau report and has recently been critical of the financial practices of the sovereign wealth fund Mumtalakat.
Meanwhile, Isa al-Kooheji, Adel al-Asoumi (1st Capital) and Mohammed al-Jowder (5th Muharraq) have clear activist-progressive tendencies, putting them clearly in the Activist camp. Bin-Hamid, Al-Jowder and Al-Kooheji are outspoken on issues of curbing wastage of public funds and good governance.
Ali al-Atish (6th Capital) – like Al-Kooheji and Qaratah – is from the minority of existing MPs who regained their seat in the 2014 elections. Al-Atish has been able to capitalize on his parliamentary expertise and record of speaking out on controversial and difficult issues.
Ahmed Qaratah is a Sunni MP in a constituency that tends to be sympathetic to the opposition. Qaratah seems to have won the vote on his record as an outspoken figure who speaks out on issues like corruption and mismanagement. Qaratah’s economic expertise makes him a respected voice when he comments on the dangers of the growing national debt.
Adel al-Asoumi has been a constant thorn in the side of the Health Minister, resulting from Al-Asoumi’s ongoing campaign to abolish the new health fees for foreign workers. Al-Asoumi has been one of the most active figures in calling for this same Minister to be summoned for interrogation over issues raised in the Financial Audit Bureau report.
Majid al-Majid (7th Northern) was placed in the Conservative camp, but also scores highly on Activist criteria. Nasser al-Qaseer (5th Capital) could also easily be placed as an Activist (we have included him as a Progressive), although as a younger MP, he has tended to be less outspoken than figures like Al-Kooheji and Qaratah.
Statistically, the loyalists have scored very highly on both the Economy and Good Governance criteria on the effectiveness ratings. Consequently, the Activists consistently came highest on our combined Economy/Governance Index. Only Activists scored above 7 on the E/I Index (including Al-Majid) with all ten Activist MPs gaining 6.5 and above. They should also score highly on the Visibility Index, given the outspoken and activist nature of these MPs, although the correlation was not as strong as we expected.
The Activist MPs tend to be experienced figures from a business background. Therefore, they don’t necessarily correspond to a particular geographical area of Bahrain. Al-Kooheji, Al-Jowder and Bu-Ali are from the outlying areas of Muharraq. These are the three most diverse areas of Muharraq containing a broad mix of working class and wealthier Bahrainis, as well as key business districts.
Al-Asoumi, Qaratah, Bin-Hamid and Al-Atish come from the core business districts of Manama, indicating why they were successful candidates and why they have tended to emphasize commercial and governance issues.
On this basis, it would have made most sense to have put Abdulrahman Bumjaid from 4th Capital as an Activist MP. He has often sided with Al-Asoumi on issues like health fees and his constituency is one of the key business districts of Bahrain.
However, we have generally based our classifications on actual behaviour. Bumjaid is not outspoken like his Activist colleagues; he has been less visible on economic issues and in his rather low-key pronouncements he has tended to come across more as a Loyalist or Conservative.
Loyalist MPs
A number of MPs clearly stake their reputation on reliable support for the Government and outspoken defence of Bahrain’s leadership. Chairman of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, Abdullah Bin-Huwail (7th Southern) is a good example of this tendency, as are Khalifa al-Ghanim (5th Southern) and Abdulrahman Bumjaid (4th Capital).
In their roles as Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Parliament, Ahmed al-Mullah and Ali al-Aradi probably fit within the loyalist camp. However, Al-Aradi’s obvious progressive instincts and strong record on good governance have led us to put him in the Activist camp.
The Loyalists are in many ways difficult to distinguish from the Conservative camp, and arguably form a subset of the Conservatives. Statistically, the Loyalists tend to score low on good governance and on public service indices. The often score well on national security. They are broadly in line with other conservatives on the Progressive Index (3.5-4.5).
Conservatives like Al-Bakri and Al-Noaimi could easily fit within the Loyalist camp. In previous parliaments, there would have been a higher proportion of straightforward loyalists. However, in the 2014 Parliament, the vast majority of MPs are more than willing to take a stand against certain government policies when they believe they have the public interest behind them.
Geographically, we would expect to find Loyalists clustered in the pro-Monarchist heartland of the Southern Governorate. Indeed, the 5th 8th and 10th Southern districts are held by Loyalists. Several other Southern MPs like Khalid al-Shaer, Mohsin al-Bakri, Dhiyab al-Noaimi and Abdulhalim Murad could also easily be described as loyalists.
As we have noted, our fourth Loyalist – Abdulrahman Bumjaid in 4th Capital is something of an anomaly. In some respects he seems better aligned with the Activist camp, while on other criteria he could perhaps be put with the Conservatives. However, his statements and actions to date have indicated him as being most clearly aligned with the Loyalists for the time being.