24th Aug, 2013 –
The Bahraini protest movement discovered on 14 August 2014 that even after months of planning, agitation and social media publicity; it is becoming increasingly difficult to get large numbers of people out onto the streets.
Below we look at a number of the options currently facing the protest movement and consider why the option of full engagement in the National Dialogue is really the only prospect for the opposition in order to capitalize on all their activity and agitation over the past two years.
Option 1: Business as usual
This option would mean the continuation of low level rioting and attacks against police, combined with major rallies every few months around key dates. However, attendance at such events is dwindling, as is international interest and the political relevance of such activity.
It is obvious that opposition leaders realize that continuing as they are would be an admission of failure and make political societies like Al-Wefaq Islamic Society, the largest Bahraini opposition bloc, increasingly irrelevant.
Option 2: A more prominent role for Shia religious leaders
The only occasions when the opposition has succeeded in effectively mobilizing large numbers of supporters on the streets has been in response to a direct call by prominent religious figures and their affiliated political societies, or when these religious figures themselves seem to be under threat; such as the rallies after a government raid on Ayatollah Qassim’s home earlier in 2013. Ayatollah Qassim’s call to “crush” the police also resulted in a large upsurge in attacks against the security forces.
However, the opposition has been reluctant to use the religious leadership in this manner because it portrays an Islamist agenda with sectarian implications. Likewise, the opposition banned Hezbollah flags and images of prominent Iranian Ayatollahs during protest rallies (as was common in the early stages of the 2011 unrest) to stop international audiences reaching the conclusion that the Bahraini opposition is influenced by foreign interests.
Option 3: Increase in opposition militancy
Because the opposition can no longer mobilize large numbers of people without religious support, to some militants it is evident that the opposition requires more extremist measures. Attacks against civilian targets, like a Mosque, a shopping centre, a children’s play park and a sports stadium (mainly poorly designed car bombs resulting in minor casualties) is proof that some militants have already reached this conclusion.
However, moderate figures within the opposition realize that an increase in militancy would only damage the opposition’s credibility and cause further instability; a strategy from which neither the state, nor the opposition, could benefit.
Option 4: Full participation in the National Dialogue
So far Al-Wefaq Islamic Society’s participation in the Dialogue has been intermittent and non-serious. After several months Al-Wefaq are still raising procedural issues about the composition of the agenda and say they will only participate fully if all their demands are met. Al-Wefaq have also continued to support rallies, illegal marches and rioting which signals to many Bahrainis that they are not serious about peaceful negotiations.
Although Al Wefaq has not directly condoned the violence used by more extremist elements of the Bahraini opposition, they have only recently begun explicitly, yet infrequently, condemning the use of violence and low level rioting as a means of coercing the government into submitting to opposition demand.
Conclusion
With active support for the protest movement getting less day by day it is in the opposition’s own best interest to stop placing obstacles and to fully participate in the reconciliation process. Opposition parties, such as Al-Wefaq, have also threatened to boycott the 2014 Parliamentary elections. If they want to operate within Bahrain’s parliamentary system, they should return to the parliamentary path and win back seats for their representatives – rather than trying to undermine Bahrain’s system of National Assembly.
It is also increasingly obvious that the protest movement itself is fragmenting between moderates who want negotiations and militants who favor revolution. It is a divide between an increasingly irrelevant secular wing of the protest movement and Islamist hardliners.
The failure of the opposition to coherently mobilize its supporters for a date, which it clearly considered to be its best opportunity for several months, proves that the path of unrest, militancy and protest has failed. The situation in Egypt proves that such a path is a recipe for disaster whose only results are a polarized society, anarchy and escalating violence. No Bahraini wants this.
The Bahraini opposition should seriously start checking their options and start to realize that dialogue and reconciliation are the only viable options – both for them and the rest of Bahrain.